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 This thesis examines the impact that far-right terrorism opportunity structures and 
temporal patterns of precursor activity have on incident outcomes. Data from the American 
Terrorism Study (ATS) are extracted for several attributes of far-right opportunity, in addition to 
measures for temporal patterns of planning and preparatory behaviors. Bivariate and multivariate 
findings generally support expectations that target attractiveness and vulnerability, far-right 
group structures, and patterns of precursor activity are significantly associated with incident 
outcomes. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research and several implications for 
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On the morning of April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh awoke with one goal in mind – 
punish the United States government. After months of meticulous planning and preparation, 
McVeigh carefully drove a Ryder rental truck carrying 7,000 pounds of explosives to the Alfred 
P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Shortly after 9 a.m., he ignited the 
fuse, exited the truck, and waited for the bomb to detonate. The devastating explosion, which 
killed 168 and injured over 500 more, was the worst act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history 
(Michel & Herbeck, 2001). Many Americans were surprised to learn that a homegrown, right-
wing extremist was capable of preparing for, and successfully executing, a large-scale attack on 
the federal government. However, McVeigh was not the only far-right extremist planning a 
major terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the spring of 1995. In the wake of the Oklahoma City 
bombing, members of a group known as the Oklahoma Constitutional Militia spent months 
recruiting, acquiring explosive materials, and holding meetings to discuss a plot to detonate 
improvised explosive devices at gay bars, abortion clinics, and civil liberty watch group offices. 
Fortunately, law enforcement was able to successfully interdict the plot and arrest members of 
the group before the attacks occurred, potentially saving countless lives. 
Research suggests that the individuals who adhere to violent far-right ideologies pose a 
significant risk to the American public (Gruenewald, Freilich, & Chermak, 2009; Riley, 
Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005; Simone, Freilich, & Chermak, 2008). One study, for 
example, found that between 1978 and 2000, far-right terrorists claimed over 250 lives (Hewitt, 
2003). More recently, Freilich and Chermak (2007) observed that far-rightists have committed 
over 270 homicides since 1990, resulting in over 500 deaths. Although violent far-right 
extremists have carried out numerous ideologically motivated terrorist acts, many other planned 
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attacks have either failed or are foiled by law enforcement. While it is clear that McVeigh and 
the members of the Oklahoma Constitutional Militia diverged in their decisions regarding target 
selection, weaponry use, affiliation with groups, and other preparatory activities, precisely what 
distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful attacks remains unclear. In order to devise 
more informed terrorism prevention practices, it is necessary to advance our understanding of 
how situational behaviors, far-right group dynamics, and pre-incident decision-making shape 
successful outcomes.  
To date, research on violent right-wing extremism has primarily focused on the 
background characteristics of far-right terrorists themselves (Smith, 1994). Most empirical 
studies have stopped short of examining why some far-right terrorism incidents are unsuccessful 
while others succeed. However, we do know something about the opportunity structure of 
terrorism that shapes terrorist outcomes. In their book Outsmarting the Terrorists, Clarke and 
Newman (2006) draw from tenets of situational crime prevention (SCP) to suggest that terrorists 
are rational decision-makers who carefully assess opportunities to commit attacks. Specifically, 
the level of target attractiveness and vulnerability, as well as the weaponry required for specific 
forms of attack, are viewed as two important elements of opportunity that shape terrorists’ 
decision-making processes.  
Another key element of terrorist opportunity involves the type of group structure under 
which terrorists operate. Clarke and Newman (2006) suggest that terrorists often operate within 
organized group structures to overcome logistical difficulties of planning an attack. Further, 
Becker (2014) adds that, compared to terrorist groups, lone wolves have relatively limited access 
to firearms and explosives manufacturing expertise, fewer resources, and sometimes lack 
surveillance capabilities, which could potentially impact terrorism incident success. However, in 
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a recent report, Smith, Roberts, Gruenewald, and Klein (2014) discovered that lone actor 
terrorists have significantly longer lifecycles than group affiliated actors, suggesting that lone 
actors may be more able to extend the longevity of their campaign by avoiding law enforcement 
detection. 
Lastly, we also know something about how terrorist acts are achieved, or the steps 
terrorists take prior to engaging in terrorism events. In a preliminary study of the temporal 
patterns of terrorists’ precursor conduct, Smith and colleagues (2008) found that terrorist 
offenders engaged in antecedent behaviors,1 on average, three months prior the planned attack. 
Importantly, right-wing terrorists committed almost half (43%) of all antecedent behaviors more 
than six months in advance to the terrorism incident. The most common types of activities 
included meetings to discuss plot formation and weapons procurement, manufacturing, and 
testing. While Smith and colleagues (2008) acknowledged some limitations to their study, it is 
clear from the preliminary findings that far-rightists generally spend a considerable amount of 
time engaging in planning and preparatory behaviors that may be in some ways temporally 
patterned.  
Although previous research has advanced our understanding of terrorist opportunity and 
temporal patterns of terrorists’ precursor activity, extant research has yet to consider how each 
correlates with far-right terrorism incident success. The goal of the current study, then, is to 
explore the relationship between far-right opportunity structures (e.g., targets, weaponry, and 
group structures), temporal patterns of precursor conduct, and incident outcomes. Two broad 
research questions guide the current study: (1) How do opportunity structures affect the 
likelihood of successful far-right attack outcomes? (2) How do temporal sequences of 
planning processes affect the likelihood of successful far-right attack outcomes? To address 
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the above questions, the current study extracts and analyzes data from the American Terrorism 
Study (ATS) related to “officially designated” far-right terrorism incidents occurring in the 
United States from 1978 to 2010. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
There are two primary reasons why so little is known about the relationship between 
terrorist opportunity, temporal patterns of precursor conduct, and the outcomes of far-right 
terrorism incidents. First, scholars note that terrorism research has traditionally been conducted 
atheoretically (Damphousse & Smith, 2004; Hamm, 2007; Smith, 1994). As LaFree and 
Hendrickson (2007) suggest, studying terrorism from a criminal justice perspective offers 
important insights into terrorist behavior. While some recent studies have attempted to apply 
criminological theory to explain the etiology and commission of terrorist-oriented crime (e.g., 
Boba, 2009; Clarke & Newman, 2006; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Freilich & Chermak, 
2009; Hamm, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2004; Weisburd & Lernau, 2006), few terrorism studies to date 
have been both theoretically framed from a criminological perspective and rooted in empirical 
analysis (for exceptions, see Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Smith & Damphousse 1996, 
1998).  
Second, the quality of research on right-wing terrorism in the United States has been 
relatively poor. In a systematic review of far-right studies, Gruenewald, Freilich and Chermak 
(2009) noted several shortcomings in the existing literature. Most remarkably, they found that 83 
percent of far-right studies lacked a quantitative analysis, including basic descriptive statistics. 
This may be due to the number of methodological issues regarding terrorism research overall 
(see Freilich, Chermak, & Caspi, 2009), as well as the limited availability of data on far-right 
terrorism. In a more general critique of terrorism research, Silke (2001) also points out that 
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terrorism studies have been largely unempirical, further stunting efforts to statistically test 
theoretical explanations of terrorist offending.  
 
Contribution of the Current Study 
The current paper contributes to the literature by overcoming several theoretical and 
methodological limitations in prior research, as well as by informing policies and practices of 
local law enforcement. First, this study proposes a cohesive theoretical approach for 
understanding terrorism incident outcomes by drawing from multiple strains of criminological 
theory. From rational choice theory, I argue that terrorists make logical decisions to increase 
their chances for success. Although the ultimate goal of terrorism might be to alter a country’s 
social or political landscape, successfully executing single attacks is an important step toward 
this end.  
This thesis also contributes to the literature by overcoming methodological limitations. 
Specifically, the current study empirically analyzes 88 “officially designated” far-right terrorism 
incidents from 1978 to 2010. Concerns regarding the “poor” quality of right-wing terrorism 
studies will be addressed by utilizing data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) in order to 
(a) empirically measure the relationship between far-right opportunity structures, temporal 
patterns, and attack outcomes, and (b) quantitatively explain why some far-right terrorist attacks 
succeed while others do not. The ATS provides a unique opportunity to conduct this study, as it 
includes data on failed, foiled, and successful far-right incidents, in addition to information on 
far-rightists’ target selection, weaponry, and group structure. Moreover, the ATS contains one of 
the most comprehensive data sets on terrorists’ pre-incident activities, allowing for temporal 
analyses to be conducted. For these reasons, the results from the proposed study hold a 
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significant amount of promise for future terrorism research and law enforcement counter-
terrorism investigations. 
Finally, this paper extends the growing literature on the local role of policing in 
homeland security, and specifically, in preventing future terrorist attacks. Since the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it has been suggested that law enforcement should shift their 
traditionally reactive anti-terrorism role to a more proactive approach (Marks & Sun, 2007; 
Shields, Damphousse, & Smith, 2009). As part of an encompassing homeland security strategy, 
law enforcement agencies are increasingly focused on the prevention of terrorism incidents 
through intelligence-led policing (ILP) strategies (Carter & Carter, 2009; Clarke & Newman, 
2007; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007), including the sharing of information among 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (Carter, Chermak, McGarrell, Carter, & Drew, 
2013; Marks & Sun, 2007). Greater emphasis has been placed on the local role of law 
enforcement in the prevention of terrorist attacks (Docobo, 2005; Thatcher, 2005). By exploring 
the situated spatial-temporal dimensions of far-right terrorist attacks and pre-incident activities, 
local law enforcement can employ more informed intervention strategies, as well as make it 
more difficult to carry out terrorism incidents (Docobo, 2005).  
 The remainder of this paper unfolds in three sections. First, I discuss the past and present 
threats of far-right terrorism in the United States, while also highlighting the various ideologies, 
targets, and tactics of far-right terrorism. Second, the theoretical approach utilized in the current 
study is presented along with prior research examining successful and unsuccessful terrorist 
attacks. Third, I provide a review of the data and chosen method utilized in the current research. 
Fourth, the findings from bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses are provided. Finally, I 
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discuss results from the findings section while also suggesting policy implications and directions 
for future research. 
  
 
FAR-RIGHT TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Violent right-wing extremism in the United States has endured a multifaceted and 
dynamic history involving several transformations (Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Smith, 1994). While 
the most recent reports indicate that the number of far-right groups has declined slightly (Potok, 
2014), far-right extremists continue to maintain a significant presence in the U.S. In fact, the 
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reports that over 900 right-wing groups are operating 
within the U.S currently (Potok, 2014). Most members of far-right groups do not engage in crime 
and still fewer commit serious violent offenses. Nevertheless, there have been several high-
profile mass shootings committed by far-rightists just in the past few years, including deadly 
attacks at a Sikh Indian temple and Jewish recreational center. Furthermore, a recent survey of 
state police agencies found that police continue to view far-right terrorism as a prominent threat 
(Chermak, Freilich, & Simone, 2010). In order to develop informed terrorism prevention 
strategies, it is necessary to understand the varied threats posed by far-right terrorists.  
While far-right wing extremism is ideologically distinguishable from other terrorist 
movements (e.g. Al Qaeda and affiliated movements, eco-terrorism, etc.) who may be operating 
within the U.S., there are also several ideologically based divisions that constitute the broader 
right-wing movement. Many far-rightists are most aptly classified as white supremacists, 
belonging to such groups as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) (Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Bushart, Craig, & 
Barnes, 1998; Flint, 2001; Hewitt, 2000; Sprinzak, 1995) or the violent, prison-based 
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organization known as the Aryan Brotherhood (Irwin, 1980; Fleisher & Decker, 2001; Orlando-
Morningstar, 1997; Pelz, Marquart, & Pelz, 1991). Other far-rightists are adherents of the 
Christian Identity movement who are fueled by a racially bigoted set of religious beliefs (Arena 
& Arrigo, 2000; Barkun, 1997; Hoffman, 1987; Hoffman, 1995; Kaplan, 1993; Sharpe, 2000; 
Smith, 1994). During the last few decades, the Christian Identify movement has had significant 
influences on informal and formal groups of racist, neo-Nazi, skinhead groups (Ezekiel, 2002; 
Hamm, 1994; Whitsel, 2001), and the fervently anti-government Christian patriot and militia 
movement (Barkun, 1996; Durham, 1996; Levitas, 2002; Neiwert, 1999). Other groups like the 
anti-Christian Creativity Movement may borrow heavily from these other divisions in regard to 
their white supremacist and anti-Semitic beliefs, but are unique in their rejection of religious 
beliefs (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Durham, 2003; Michael, 2006). Still, other right-wing 
extremists are more concerned with a single political or social issue. Examples of single-issue 
far-rightists include anti-abortion activists (Blanchard, 1996; Carlson, 1995; Grimes, Forest, 
Kirkman, & Radford 1991; Kaplan, 1996; King & Husting, 2003; Wilson & Lynxwiler, 1988) 
and sovereign citizens who flatly reject their U.S. citizenship and their responsibilities to pay 
taxes (Anti-Defamation League, 2012; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).  
Right-wing extremists adhering to these various ideological beliefs have been responsible 
for crimes against a number of target types, including racial and ethnic minorities, federal 
government buildings and employees, abortion clinics and doctors, religious institutions, and 
religious minorities. The types of crimes committed by far-rightists have included extortion, 
lynching, assault, and armored car robberies. The most serious of these crimes includes murder, 
and since 1990 right-wing extremists have engaged in over 270 homicides that have resulted in 
over 500 deaths (Freilich & Chermak, 2007).  
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In sum, right-wing terrorists remain a substantial threat to the United States, and in order 
to effectively protect the public, it is important to understand why and how far-right terrorism 
incidents are successfully executed. In the following sections, the theoretical approach guiding 






 The following theoretical framework draws from several criminological strains and 
concepts to provide a comprehensive approach for understanding far-right terrorism incident 
success. The ensuing discussion of the current study’s theoretical orientation is broken down into 
two general sections. First, I review the main propositions of rational choice and how they relate 
to terrorists as rational actors. Second, I provide a background of the criminal event perspective 
as it relates to crime and terrorism, situating key variables of interest within the proposed 
theoretical framework. 
The utilitarian rational choice theory asserts that criminals consciously assess the risks 
associated with crime and choose to offend, and thus are not solely driven to commit crime 
because of structural or social conditions. Cornish and Clarke (1986) argue that criminals are 
fundamentally self-interested and that “crimes are broadly the result of rational choices based on 
analyses of anticipated costs and benefits” (p. VI). In other words, individuals engage in crime 
only when the expected benefits of the criminal act outweigh the anticipated costs. Similarly, 
terrorists analyze the costs and benefits of carrying out specific terrorist attacks. While the 
ultimate goal of terrorism might be to change the political or social structure of the United States, 
an important step toward this end is carrying out successful terrorism incidents.  
 
10 
Structuring Opportunities for Crime and Terrorism 
 Since terrorism research has yet to provide a cohesive theoretical framework for 
understanding terrorism incident outcomes, the proposed thesis draws from the criminological 
literature discussing crime as “events” and the various opportunities that shape criminal event 
outcomes. I begin by borrowing from the criminal event perspective (CEP) developed by Meier, 
Kennedy, and Sacco (2001), which argues that crime is a process that includes precursor, 
transaction, and aftermath stages within certain social contexts. While CEP is not itself a theory 
of crime, it does draw from several theoretical strains, including situational, offender, and victim 
theories. First, CEP views crime as a result of the intersection of offenders and situations, and as 
the interactions between offenders themselves. Importantly, opportunity is viewed as a necessary 
precondition for crime to occur. Moreover, the criminal event perspective assumes that crime is 
not homogenous; crime involves different motives, targets, and situational and social contexts. 
Thus, different types of crimes may be made up of distinct opportunity structures in which 
routine criminals exploit. Lastly, the CEP views criminal events as having precursors, or “factors 
that precede and shape the content of events” (Meier, Kennedy, & Sacco, 2001, p. 11). This is 
particularly relevant for the study of terrorism, as extant literature has documented that terrorists 
engage in precursor activities prior to committing terrorism incidents (Smith & Damphousse, 
2009).  
While traditional theories tend to deemphasize the importance of opportunity and its role 
in shaping criminal outcomes, the criminal event perspective places opportunity as a crucial 
prerequisite for crime. Similarly, Clarke’s (1980) situational crime prevention (SCP) or 
“opportunity theory” considers situational incentives a major correlate of criminal events. 
Indeed, SCP assumes that criminal events are “situated” by occurring within particular spatial 
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and temporal settings. Thus, the intersection of offenders and the physical environment produces 
unique opportunities to break the law (Clarke, 1980). Underlying the SCP approach is the belief 
that in order to prevent criminal events from occurring, the opportunities to offend must be 
decreased.  
Extending situational crime prevention theory to the study of politically and socially 
motivated crime, Clarke and Newman (2006) argue that terrorism can also be reduced by 
removing opportunity, suggesting the opportunity structure of terrorism may play an important 
role in shaping terrorist event outcomes (successful or failed). According to Clarke and Newman 
(2006), terrorism occurs when motivated individuals, or violent extremists, come into contact 
with opportunities more conducive to attack. Thus, terrorists rationally assess and exploit the 
opportunities afforded in order to increase their chances for successfully executing attacks.  
Although opportunity is largely associated with the relations between offenders and 
targets/victims of crime, the criminal event perspective also contends that opportunity can 
involve the relations among offenders themselves. In this way, Warr (2001) suggests that older 
and more experienced criminals engage in a process called “active opportunity,” in which 
criminals search for trustworthy co-offenders to aid in the identifying and carrying out of 
criminal acts (p. 78). Among adolescent groups, the availability of delinquent peers can also be 
considered a form of opportunity. Sutherland (1947) long ago revealed the importance of 
delinquent peer association as a necessary condition for crime to occur. As a component of 
opportunity, delinquent peer association increases situational inducements for crime, as well as 
provides motivation to engage in delinquency (Warr, 2001).  
For terrorists, co-offending presents both positive and negative consequences associated 
with terrorism incident success. For instance, collaborating with likeminded others allows 
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terrorists to attain new skills, such as for building destructive devices, operating weaponry, and 
conducting surveillance of targets that are often necessary for the successful commission of a 
terrorism incident. However, despite the potential opportunity-inducing benefits of operating 
within an organized group, collaborating with other known violent extremists increases the 
likelihood for law enforcement interdiction. Thus, terrorists may also adopt a “leaderless 
resistance” or lone wolf strategy in order to reduce the risk of law enforcement detection, and in 
increase the opportunity to commit acts of terrorism (Smith et al., 2014).  
Finally, the criminal event perspective considers the precursor stage of crime to be a 
significant aspect in shaping criminal outcomes. To this point, Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco 
(2001) suggest that the temporal ordering of behaviors preceding crime is an important factor 
affecting the content of the criminal event itself. Indeed, criminology has a rich tradition in 
examining temporal patterns of behaviors associated with routine crime. Wolfgang’s (1958) 
study on patterns of homicide in Philadelphia, for example, is one of the earliest works analyzing 
temporal relationships. In addition, other criminological studies on organized crime have shed 
light on how antecedent preparatory crimes are necessary to fund and maintain complex criminal 
syndicates (Abadinsky, 2000; Albanese, 1996).  
More recent studies of terrorist-oriented crime have also described the type and temporal 
ordering of precursor behaviors. In a study examining terrorist opportunity, Roach, Ekblom, and 
Flynn (2005) identified several conditions under which terrorism might occur by looking at 
precursor variables, such as efforts to obtain resources and training. In another study, Cothren et 
al. (2008) found that terrorists of various ideological backgrounds participate in antecedent 
preparatory events, revealing ideologically unique patterns of precursor behaviors.  
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Although terrorism is often a sophisticated form of crime that requires forethought and 
preparation, engaging in a high volume of precursor acts over a long period of time might alert 
criminal justice third parties, and by extension, impact the occurrence of the crime itself. To this 
end, Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco (2001) maintain that an essential attribute of the precursor stage 
of criminal events is the presence of bystanders, witnesses, or law enforcement, whose actions 
prior to the criminal act might prevent the crime from taking place. Extending this idea to 
terrorist-oriented crime, it follows that terrorists who participate in a large degree of antecedent 
preparations run the risk of being discovered by law enforcement through undercover agents and 
confidential informants, thus decreasing the potential opportunities to successfully carry out 
attacks. 
Synthesizing the aforementioned theories and related concepts, the current paper suggests 
that terrorists aspire to successfully carry out single attacks, and they do so by logically making 
decisions to increase their chances for success by analyzing the opportunity structure of 
terrorism, and considering the benefits and risks associated with working in groups, and 
engaging in planning and preparatory acts before committing attacks. It is also held that some 
components of terrorist opportunity structures, including the level of attractiveness and 
vulnerability of targets, the weaponry required for specific forms of attack, and terrorist group 
dynamics, will impact the successfulness of far-right terrorism incidents. In addition, the 
proposed theoretical framework maintains that the nature of antecedent behaviors, including the 
frequency of preparatory behaviors and the amount of time terrorists take planning and preparing 
for terrorism events, structure opportunities for terrorism, and by extension, the effectiveness of 
terrorist attacks. In the sections to follow, I discuss prior evidence regarding terrorism incident 
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success/failure, as well as the previous research on terrorist opportunity (including the targets, 




Law enforcement counterterrorism strategies should be grounded in a comprehensive 
understanding of how terrorist attacks are successfully executed. In one of the few studies to 
empirically examine unsuccessful domestic terrorism incidents to date, Dahl (2011) studied 176 
failed terrorist plots in order to identify the most effective counterterrorism measures. He found 
that terror plots failed primarily because of law enforcement intervention, though some terrorists 
called off attacks (5%), and other attacks were attempted, but failed (8%). Of the domestic plots 
that failed due to law enforcement actions, the vast majority was thwarted because of human 
intelligence derived from undercover agents, confidential informants, and tips from the public 
(Dahl, 2011).  
Other research on terrorist attack success/failure has relied on case study examples to 
identify some of the conditions that might shape terrorism incident outcomes. The Department of 
Homeland Security, for example, studied several factors correlating to operational success, 
including access to targets, terrorist training, and operational proficiency. This report identified 
the steps required to complete attacks, such as target selection, attack method and weaponry 
selection, training, and intelligence gathering (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). 
Additionally, Jackson and Frelinger (2009) found that terrorism incident success often depended 
on whether terrorists’ operational skills, knowledge of intended targets, and technical capabilities 
were well matched to the requirements of the operation. Although these studies have made 
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important steps toward understanding why some terrorism incidents succeed and others fail, no 
study has analyzed the causal links between terrorist event opportunity structures or the temporal 
patterns of precursor conduct that could potentially shape far-right incident outcomes.  
 
Terrorist Opportunity 
Clarke and Newman (2006) contend that terrorism is the result of an interaction between 
motivation and opportunity. As a consequence, they applied principles of situational crime 
prevention (SCP) to the study of terrorism “opportunity structures”, or “the arrangements of 
everyday life that create the opportunities that terrorists exploit” (Clarke & Newman, 2006 p.7). 
Terrorist opportunity involves four categories: (1) targets, (2) weapons, (3) tools, and (4) 
facilitating conditions.2  
While it may appear as though terrorist have an unlimited selection of targets to choose 
from, ideological beliefs dictate the types of targets selected for attack (Drake, 1998). Thus, far-
rightists execute attacks on nonwhites, federal government buildings and/or personnel, abortion 
clinics/doctors, and Jewish institutions and/or persons. What is more, Clarke and Newman 
(2006) maintain that some targets offer greater rewards with fewer costs. Therefore, terrorists 
logically choose targets based on assessments of the target’s attractiveness and vulnerability for 
specific attacks. Accordingly, terrorists rationally select targets that are attractive (iconic, 
legitimate, and near), and vulnerable (exposed, destructible, and easy to attack) (Clarke & 
Newman, 2006). It is expected that when target attractiveness and vulnerability is high, terrorists 
are more likely to execute attacks. 
 In addition to terrorists’ selection of targets, the weaponry utilized for certain terrorism 
incidents are a subsequent component of terrorist opportunity. Clarke and Newman (2006) 
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contend there are three basic categories of weapons for terrorists to choose from: guns and other 
small arms, explosives, and unconventional weapons (e.g. nuclear, chemical, and biological). 
Characteristics of the weaponry providing terrorists with the greatest opportunities include 
weapons that are “multipurpose, undetectable, removable, destructive, enjoyable, reliable, 
obtainable, uncomplicated, and safe” (Clarke & Newman, 2006, p.108). Legault & Hendrickson 
(2009) argue that firearms maintain each of these nine characteristics of opportunity. Indeed, it 
appears that firearms are relatively safe, lethal, easy to use, and readily available in the United 
States, making firearms a primary weapon of choice among domestic terrorists (Legault & 
Hendrickson, 2009, p. 536). What is more, it seems as though firearms are less sophisticated and 
uncomplicated to use when compared to explosive devices, suggesting that firearms are less 
likely to malfunction during the commission of an attack.  
Although not part of the opportunity structure examined by Clarke and Newman (2006), 
terrorist group structure types can also be considered a unique form of terrorist opportunity. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that terrorists operating within a structured, hierarchical unit may 
provide support networks in which to aid in the planning and commission of terrorism events. 
However, working as an organized group may open the terrorist conspiracy to law enforcement 
intervention through undercover agents and confidential informants (Damphousse & Smith, 
2004). To overcome the risks associated with group-based terrorism, many far-rightists have 
adopted a leaderless resistance model of “unstructured violence” calling for small cell networks 
and lone attackers (Damphousse & Smith, 2004). In fact, the United States in recent years has 
experienced an upsurge of attacks perpetrated by lone wolf, or unaffiliated terrorists (Hewitt, 
2003; Spaaij, 2010). What is more, lone wolf attacks in the U.S. have been largely perpetrated by 
far-rightists, and many expect such attacks to increase (Bates, 2012; Damphousse & Smith, 
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2004; Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013b; Hewitt, 2003; Michael, 2012). Importantly, 
Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013b) found significant offender, victim, and incident 
differences between far-right lone wolves and lone wolf packs that do not operate alone and who 
affiliate with other extremists operating within a formal or informal far-right organization. In a 
more recent study of federally indicted terrorist-offenders, Smith et al. (2014, p.2) found that 
lone actor terrorists are significantly more educated, live greater distances from the incident 
location, and engage in significantly fewer precursor activities relative to terrorist groups/cells.  
 
Temporal Patterns of Precursor Conduct 
The work of Smith and colleagues (2006) has significantly advanced our understanding 
of how criminal and non-criminal precursor behaviors of far-right terrorists’ are temporally 
patterned. Using data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) Smith, Damphousse, and 
Roberts (2006) found that prior to committing a terrorism incident, far-rightists most often 
engaged in weapons violations, bank fraud, threats, and bank robberies in preparation for 
planned terrorist attacks. Far-rightists also engaged in non-criminal antecedent behaviors, such as 
meetings and phone calls to discuss logistics of the plot. Of all antecedent activity, most of which 
was both criminal and non-criminal preparatory behavior,3 over 70 percent occurred greater than 
one month in advance to the incident act. Nearly half of the antecedent acts analyzed were 
carried out at least six months before the terrorism incident. Importantly, Smith et al.’s (2006) 
findings reveal that far-rightists engage in a significant amount of precursor activity (some of 
which is criminal in nature) that occurs over a long period of time, providing law enforcement 
with opportunities to possibly infiltrate the terrorist conspiracy and thwart the intended attack. 
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In sum, several scholars have examined key components of the opportunity structures 
thought to shape terrorist decision-making, but none have empirically examined how opportunity 
and other important factors thought to shape terrorist events affect the successfulness of terrorist 
outcomes. Grounded in the rational choice and related criminal event perspectives, the proposed 
study seeks to extend prior research by testing six hypotheses related to how successfulness of 
far-right terrorist incidents is shaped by opportunity structures and the temporal patterning of 
terrorists’ precursor behaviors.  
 
H1 The more attractive the target, the more likely the incident will be successfully 
executed. 
 
H2 The more vulnerable the target, the more likely the incident will be successfully 
executed. 
 
H3 Terrorism incidents involving firearms and other conventional weapons are more 
likely to be successfully executed than incidents involving Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) and other nonconventional weapons. 
 
H4 Terrorism incidents involving lone perpetrators are more likely to be successfully 
executed than incidents involving groups or cells. 
 
H5 The shorter the planning cycle, the more likely the terrorism incident will be 
successfully executed 
 




DATA AND METHOD 
Data on far-right terrorism incidents are extracted from a single source known as the 
American Terrorism Study (ATS). Over the past 30 years, the ATS has collected information on 
federally investigated criminal cases resulting from indictments under an FBI “terrorism 
enterprise” investigation. In addition to maintaining data on incidents resulting from FBI 
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investigations, the ATS also includes “commonly known” acts of terrorism beyond those 
prosecuted in federal court that were carefully selected by a panel of terrorism subject matter 
experts.4 The ATS relies on the FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism, which states that 
terrorism is the “unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual 
based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction 
committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2005, p. V).” Once identified, terrorism incident data are then collected 
and coded by a team of researchers5 who utilize information derived from court case documents 
(e.g. indictments, sentencing memorandums, and transcripts) augmented by open source media 
information, such as books, government reports, newspapers, and online media articles.  
The unit of analysis for the current study is incidents of far-right terrorism, which include 
a total number of 88 successful (46) and unsuccessful (42) terrorism incidents. All far-right 
incidents involved perpetrators who were motivated by one or more right-wing sub-ideology, 
including white supremacism, anti-semitism, posse comitatus, neo-fascism, anti-abortion, and 
anti-government. Thus, far-right incidents perpetrated by individuals adhering to 
nationalist/separatist sub-ideologies (e.g. Jewish Defense League and Yahweh) and those 
incidents for which a distinct far-right sub-ideology could not be identified were excluded from 
analysis.  
In order to maintain the most robust, consistent, and reliable sample possible, several 
additional steps were taken to reduce missing data, confirm existing values, and increase the 
reliability of previous coding. For example, a group of trained coders were selected to review a 
number of ATS terrorism case studies with existing incidents and associated precursor events. 
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These select case studies were carefully examined and coders were able to identify additional 
planned, foiled, failed, and successful far-right terrorism incidents for analysis. Moreover, this 
team of coders verified existing incident-level variable coding, as well as reduced the volume of 
missing precursor event data.  
To be sure, although steps were taken to increase the total number of far-right incidents 
for this study, caution should be used when generalizing statistical results to “all” far-right 
terrorist activity and related violent crimes. That said, despite the conservative population of 
terrorism incidents contained within the ATS, the database has provided researchers and 




The ATS includes terrorism incidents successfully perpetrated by far-rightists and 
planned far-right attacks that were failed or foiled, making it possible to test models that predict 
far-right incident success. The dependent variable in the current study, incident outcome, is 
binary coded (0 = unsuccessful incident, 1 = successful incident). Unsuccessful incident 
outcomes are defined as (a) planned terrorism incidents in which a target or target type was 
explicitly identified and at least one overt step (e.g. collecting weapons, reconnoitering the 
target, etc.) was made toward carrying out the plot, and (b) attempted incidents that failed to 
injure the targeted victim, cause significant damage to the intended target, or were cancelled for 
whatever reason (Dahl, 2011). Terrorist plots that were foiled by police or attempted incidents in 
which the terrorists’ weaponry failed to detonate are common examples of unsuccessful 
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terrorism incidents. Successful incident outcomes are terrorism incidents in which the weapon 
was delivered to the intended target and caused significant amounts of damage.  
 
Independent Variables 
The first set of independent variables predicting attack success involves the opportunity 
structure of terrorism. Following Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, and Klein’s (2015) 
operationalization of Clarke and Newman’s (2006) EVIL DONE framework to the targets of 
eco-terrorism, the current study measures the attractiveness (vital, iconic, legitimate, and near) 
and vulnerability (exposed, destructible, easy) of far-right terrorists’ target selection.7 In 
addition, other measures of terrorist opportunity are also included in the current study, such as 
the weaponry utilized in far-right terrorism incidents and far-right group structures. The final set 
of independent variables predicting attack success involves the temporal patterns of precursor 
activity, including two independent measures of terrorism planning cycles and two variables 
examining the volume of precursor activity occurring prior to a terrorism incident.  
Attractiveness of Targets 
The first measure of target attractiveness is vitalness, which is binary coded (0 = non-
vital, 1 = vital). Target vitalness is operationalized as the impact that the terrorism incident has 
on the routine operations of the targeted organization. Organizations that conduct daily 
operations from multiple physical locations are considered a relatively non-vital target, as the 
complete destruction of the target would only minimally impact the day-to-day operations of the 
larger organization (Gruenewald, et al., 2015). A single IRS office or employee, for example, is 
coded as non-vital to the continued day-to-day operations of the IRS as an agency.  
Contrastingly, vital targets are more attractive to far-rightists as the complete destruction of the 
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target would significantly affect the day-to-day activities of the larger organization (Gruenewald, 
et al., 2015). Common examples include religious institutions (e.g. synagogues, mosques, and 
churches) and local businesses that conduct all operations within a single targeted site.  
The next component of target attractiveness is iconicity. For the current study, target 
iconicity is binary coded (0 = low iconic value, 1 = high iconic value) and measured as whether 
or not a target is symbolic to far-right terrorist ideology. Incidents involving government 
organizations, Jewish institutions, minorities, and abortion providers are more attractive for 
having high iconic value, while incidents targeting utilities (e.g. electrical transmission lines) and 
local commercial organizations are less attractive and have a relatively low iconic value. Another 
measure of target attractiveness is target legitimacy. In the current study, legitimacy is binary 
coded (0 = non-legitimate, 1 = legitimate) and operationalized as the extent to which terrorist 
sympathizers might view the target as being directly responsible for ideologically based 
grievances (Gruenewald, et al., 2015). Targets considered unattractive and non-legitimate 
involve targeted organizations that house children or a portion of the general public. For 
instance, many anti-government far-right sympathizers condone Timothy McVeigh for killing 
several small children who were inside the first floor daycare center at the Alfred P. Murrah 
federal building. Consequently, the Murrah building is considered in the current study as 
illegitimate, as it houses a segment of the general public. On the other hand, incidents involving 
institutions that house only the individuals directly associated with the targeted organization are 
considered attractive and legitimate targets. Additionally, specific individuals (e.g., IRS agents, 
federal judges, abortion doctors, etc.) identified by sympathizers of far-right terrorism as worthy 
of harm are also considered legitimate targets.  
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The final component of target attractiveness is the nearness of targets. Near targets are 
attractive, as they are relatively close to the terrorist’s residence, easily accessible, and require 
little effort to attack (Clarke & Newman, 2006). To measure this variable, coders calculated a 
straight-line distance estimate (in miles) between the address of the closest perpetrator’s 
residence at the time of the incident and the address in which the target was located at the time of 
the incident.8 
Vulnerability of Targets 
The first measure of target vulnerability involves the degree to which targets are exposed. 
Exposed targets are binary coded (0 = non-exposed, 1 = exposed) and operationalized in this 
study as how accessible the target is to the public, in addition to how often the target is 
frequented by the general public. Targets that are inaccessible without permission from 
owners/managers, and targets that are accessible, but rarely frequented by the public are 
considered non-exposed targets (Gruenewald, et al., 2015). Common examples include federal 
buildings, private dwellings, and electrical transmission lines. Conversely, targets that are 
accessible and routinely frequented by the public are considered relatively exposed and 
vulnerable targets, such as abortion clinics, religious institutions, and community centers.9  
Another component of target vulnerability is target destructibility, which is binary coded 
(0 = less destructible, 1 = destructible). Far-rightists are often interested in attacking vulnerable 
targets that can be easily damaged or completely destroyed (Clarke & Newman, 2006). Thus, 
target destructibility is operationalized in the current study in terms of the weaponry required to 
incapacitate the target. Moreover, consideration is also given to the size and structural make-up 
of the intended target (Gruenewald, et al., 2015). Among the least destructible and vulnerable of 
targets are multi-story buildings or high-rise structures (e.g. electrical transmission lines), targets 
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with multiple structures on site, and buildings with a large surface area that require strategically 
placed Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) for destruction. In contrast, the most destructible 
and vulnerable of targets often contain materials that serve as fire accelerants (e.g. fuel), or 
require conventional weaponry, such as firearms, knives, and blunt objects (Gruenewald, et al., 
2015). Common examples of destructible targets include propane tanks, natural gas lines, and 
human victims.10  
The last component of target vulnerability considers how easily the target can be 
accessed without detection (Gruenewald, et al., 2015). For the current study, the easiness of 
targets is binary coded (0 = difficult, 1 = easy) and determined after evaluating several security 
measures associated with a specific target or target type, including screening procedures (human 
or technological), targeted police patrols, and private security. Among the least easy and 
vulnerable of targets are incidents involving organizations or individuals in which evidence of 
one or more security measures is indicated. Common examples include high-ranking government 
officials, federal buildings, and federal courthouses. Conversely, targets coded as relatively easy 
and vulnerable to attack involve incidents in which specific security measures are not indicated 
in the source material (e.g. private dwellings, specific individuals, religious institutions/persons, 
minorities, etc.). 
Far-right Weaponry and Group Structures 
Additional components of opportunity for the current study include the type of weaponry 
used in the terrorism incident and a measure for far-right group structure. Far-right terrorists’ 
weaponry is binary coded (0 = sophisticated weaponry, 1 = conventional weaponry) and defined 
as the level of complexity involved in manufacturing and utilizing the weapon. Sophisticated 
weapons commonly include Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Improvised Incendiary 
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Devices (IIDs), and other unconventional weapons (e.g. ricin). Conventional weapons, on the 
other hand, include firearms, knives, blunt objects, or bodily weapons (e.g. hands, feet, fists). 
Group structure is operationalized as the total number offenders involved in executing the 
terrorism incident, as well as the level of assistance received by co-conspirators in planning and 
preparing for the intended attack. Following Smith, Roberts, Gruenewald, and Klein (2014), this 
variable is comprised of far-right loners and far-right groups/cells (0 = groups/cells, 1 = loners). 
Groups/cells are defined as persons who did receive some assistance in planning, preparing, or 
executing terrorism incidents, while loners had no help in planning, preparing, or committing the 
terrorism incident (Smith et al., 2014, p. 1).  
Temporal Patterns of Precursor Conduct 
Lastly, the current project drew data on far-right terrorists’ precursor activity in order to 
evaluate the impact that temporal patterns of precursor behaviors have on incident success. The 
ATS includes information on a number of antecedent events that are linked to terrorism 
incidents. These antecedent activities are typically committed to assist in the preparation and 
planning of a terrorism incident, though some events are committed for order maintenance, 
internal security, or for personal reasons (Smith et al., 2008, p. 10). To maintain the most 
consistent and reliably coded data possible, the current study only examines significant 
antecedent events, or those events that most closely relate to the terrorism incident. These 
“significant” antecedent acts are defined as pre-incident activity committed in direct or indirect 
preparation for a specific terrorism incident, or to ensure the continued survivability of the 
terrorist group or conspiracy. Therefore, precursor acts relating to non-terrorist activity (e.g. 
joining a radical, non-violent movement and non-extremist related precursor crimes), events 
committed for personal reasons, and any event in which the explicit content of the act was 
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unknown (e.g. private meetings and other communications held for unknown reasons) were 
excluded from analysis. In this way, the current study is attempting to reduce the potential for 
bias by only including terrorist activity that is most likely to be recorded in the source material, 
regardless of the incident outcome.  
The first temporal variable, conspiracy length, provides a measure for the terrorist 
planning cycle. This variable is operationalized as the length of time that takes place between the 
date of the first known antecedent event and the terrorism incident date.11 The next variable, 
number of antecedent acts, is a continuous measure defined as the total number of known 
antecedent events committed in direct or indirect preparation for a specific terrorism incident, or 
to ensure the continued survivability of the terrorist group or conspiracy. These events 
commonly include meetings to discuss group-related activities, violence committed for order 
maintenance and group survivability, weapons acquisition/storage, and member recruitment. 
The next temporal variable, preparatory length is a more precise measure for the terrorist 
planning and preparation cycle. Preparatory length is operationalized as the length of time that 
takes place between the date of initial plot formation to the terrorism incident date. Plot 
formations are recognized as the first known antecedent event in which there is explicit evidence 
of intent to commit terrorist violence against a specific target or target type.12 The final variable, 
number of preparatory acts, measures the total volume of preparatory events associated with a 
specific terrorism incident. Preparatory acts are defined as recorded antecedent behavior 
beginning with the initial formation of a terrorist plot and including any subsequent event 
committed with the explicit purpose of directly assisting in the preparation for executing a 
specific terrorism incident. The most common preparatory events identified are meetings to 
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discuss plot formation, recruitment, acquiring funding, reconnoitering targets, weapons 
acquisition/manufacturing, and training.  
It is important to note that although the ATS includes one of the most comprehensive 
data sets on terrorists’ antecedent behaviors, these data do not necessarily reflect the total 
number of preparatory and planning events associated with a single terrorism incident. 
Researchers may never know the total volume of weapons purchases, meetings, or other 
precursor acts that occur prior to terrorism incidents. However, since the current study only 
includes the most significant antecedent events for analysis (i.e. those events most closely related 
to the terrorism incident), potential threats to validity are considerably reduced. Moreover, if we 
assume that the amount of excluded or “missing” significant antecedent event data is distributed 




 I begin the analysis by examining the bivariate relationships between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable using appropriate tests of significance (chi-square analysis, 
Fisher exact test, and t-test of means). Next, I rely on binary logistic regression to assess the key 
attributes associated with successful and unsuccessful far-right terrorism incidents. Since the 
outcome variable is binary coded (0 = unsuccessful incident, 1 = successful incident), this is the 
appropriate multivariate statistical method (Long, 1997).13 Considering the relatively small 
sample size in the current study (n = 88), results from the multivariate analysis should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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I first regress the dependent variable, incident outcomes, on measures of target 
attractiveness and vulnerability, and then successively add weaponry and group structure 
variables to a subsequent model. In a separate analysis, I include measures of target 
attractiveness and vulnerability, as well as weaponry and group structure, in order to evaluate the 
fully saturated “opportunity” model. Lastly, I examine whether, and to what extent, independent 
measures of temporal patterns of precursor activity predict incident outcomes, net the effects of 
the opportunity variables found to significantly vary across incident outcomes.14 
 
Bivariate Findings 
As shown in Table 1, the incidents included in this study are nearly even split between 
successful (52.27%) and unsuccessful (47.7%) incident outcomes. The first set of  “opportunity” 
variables considers how measures of target attractiveness – one of the theoretically important 
dimensions of opportunity – compare across incident outcomes. The findings support my first 
hypothesis, showing that targets located in close proximity to the terrorists’ residences are 
significantly more associated with successful far-right incidents. Specifically, successful far-right 
terrorism incidents involve targets that are located, on average, 106 miles from the closest 
perpetrators’ residence compared with an average of approximately 329 miles for unsuccessful 
incidents. Conflicting with my research expectations, targets considered legitimate for attack are 
proportionately less likely to be associated with successful far-right incidents, though statistical 
significance is only marginal (p ≤ .10). That is, it appears that successful incidents are slightly 
less likely to involve targets deemed worthy of attack by sympathizers. In addition, all other 
measures of target attractiveness fail to support hypothesis 1. Levels of target vitalness, though 
slightly more associated with successful incidents, do not reach a level of statistical significance. 
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Moreover, I find no statistical difference in incident outcomes for targets considered especially 
iconic based on the tenets of far-right ideology.  
 
TABLE 1. Attributes of Far-right Terrorism Incidents by Outcome Type (N = 88)  
Successful Incidents  
(n = 46) 
Unsuccessful 
Incidents (n = 42) 
  
Variables n Percent   n         Percent     Chi2/T-testa 
Target Attractiveness 
      










      Legitimate target 20 22.70 
 
25 28.40 ± 
      Near target 40 106.40 (avg.) 
 
37 329.30 (avg.) ** 
Target Vulnerability 
     
      Exposed target  30 34.10 
 
17 19.30 * 




      Easy target  31 36.00 
 
17 19.80 * 
Weaponry 
       





    
* 





      
      Conspiracy length 34 273.91 (avg.) 
 
39 257.44 (avg.) 
  
      Preparatory length 25 150.56 (avg.)  37 249.70 (avg.)  
      Num. Antecedent 46 4.04 (avg.)   42 19.31 (avg.) *** 
      Num. Preparatory 46 1.46 (avg.) 
 
42 7.17 (avg.) *** 
a The Fishers exact test was used to compare categories of small sample sizes (n ≤ 5) 
b ±p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. 
 
Next, I consider attributes of opportunity involving the vulnerability of far-right targets. 
In support of hypothesis 2, exposed far-right targets are significantly more associated with 
successful incidents than unsuccessful incidents (p ≤ .05). Successful incidents involve targets 
that are accessible and routinely frequented by the public over 34 percent of the time, while 
unsuccessful incidents involve exposed targets approximately 19 percent of the time. The next 
variable considers the level of ease at which targets are penetrated. The results provided in Table 
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1 support hypothesis 2, as targets involving no security measures are proportionately more 
associated with successful incidents 36 percent of the time, while targets protected by targeted 
police patrols, private security, screening procedures, or other security measures are associated 
with unsuccessful incidents nearly 20 percent of the time. Finally, bivariate significance tests 
indicate that there are no meaningful differences across incident outcomes involving destructible 
targets, thus failing to support hypothesis 2.  
The final set of  “opportunity” variables considers both the sophistication of weaponry 
used in the incident in addition to far-right group structure. As shown in Table 1, it appears that 
weaponry sophistication does not vary to the level of statistical significance across far-right 
incident outcomes, despite conventional weaponry being proportionately more associated with 
successful incidents. Consequently, hypothesis 3 is not supported by the analysis. In contrast, the 
findings did provide some support for hypothesis 4, as successful incidents are proportionately 
more likely to involve far-right loners than unsuccessful incidents (p ≤ .05).  
I also attempt to capture the nature of temporal patterns of precursor conduct across 
incident outcomes. Notably, I find no support for hypothesis 5 expecting to find differences in 
the length of the terrorist planning cycle between successful and unsuccessful far-right incidents. 
Interestingly, it appears that both measures for planning and preparation cycle length used in the 
current study fail to reach a level of statistical significance at the bivariate level. This is not 
surprising given the small amount of variation in conspiracy and preparatory length between 
successful and unsuccessful incidents (see Table 1). Conversely, the analysis does reveal 
statistically significant and substantive differences involving the number of significant precursor 
acts across incident outcomes, providing support for hypothesis 6. Results from Table 1 indicate 
that successful incidents are significantly more likely to involve fewer antecedent acts than 
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unsuccessful incidents. In fact, incidents that fail or are foiled by law enforcement intervention 
involve nearly 5 times as many antecedent events when compared with successful incidents. 
What is more, an average of approximately 2 pre-incident preparatory events are associated with 
successful far-right incidents, while slightly more than 7 preparatory events are associated with 
unsuccessful incidents (nearly than 4 times as many). 
 
Multivariate Findings 
 Next, I examine the extent to which measures for terrorist opportunity and the temporal 
patterns of precursor conduct predict incident outcomes. Table 2 displays the results for 
regressing incident outcomes on attributes of the far-right terrorism opportunity structure. Model 
1 presents the results from the logistic regression analysis for target attractiveness and 
vulnerability, model 2 provides findings for far-right weaponry and group structure, and model 3 
displays the results for the fully saturated opportunity model.  
The results from the first model suggest that near targets are significantly and negatively 
associated with incident outcomes when controlling for other target variables (p ≤ .05). That is, 
as far-rightists live in closer proximity to the target location, the likelihood of successfully 
completing the terrorism incident increases. Next, it appears that incidents involving exposed 
targets are marginally more likely to be successfully carried out by far-rights (p ≤ .10). Lastly, 
easy targets (or targets with no security measures) are significantly more likely to be associated 
with successful incident outcomes (p ≤ .05). Target variables shown not to be significant include 
vital, iconic, legitimate, and destructible targets. In sum, the significant findings presented in 
model 1 provide only partial support for research expectations that the more attractive and 
vulnerable a target is, the more likely the far-right incident will result in success. 
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TABLE 2. Predicting Incident Outcomes Using Opportunity Variables 





Target attractiveness and vulnerability        
      Vital target -1.10(.72) .332 --- --- -1.01(.84) .364 
      Iconic target 1.13(.73) 3.093 --- --- .96(.81) 2.601 
      Legitimate target .12(.83) 1.126 --- --- -.44(.96) .645 
      Near target -.003(.001)* .997 --- --- -003(.001)* .997 
      Exposed target 1.35(.77) ± 3.840 --- --- .19(.89) 1.218 
      Destructible target  -.69(.64) .501 --- --- -1.52(.93)  .218 
      Easy target  1.55(.78)* 4.730 --- --- 2.33(.94)** 10.317 
Other opportunity characteristics         
      Conventional weaponry --- --- .33(.50) 1.387 1.32(.96) 3.760 
      Loner --- --- 1.52(.48)** 4.578 2.46(.82)** 11.692 
Constant -.88(.98) .414 -.57(.32) .641 -1.44(1.12) .237 
Chi2 22.34 11.55 35.78 
Pseudo R2 .353 .166 .518 
-2 Log likelihood 78.19     108.77     64.75   
±p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. 
  
The second model shows the results for regressing incident outcomes on far-right 
weaponry and group structure. As expected, I find that incidents involving far-right loners are 
significantly more likely to be successful relative to incidents involving groups/cells (p ≤ .01). In 
contrast to research expectations, I find no significant differences in incident outcome regarding 
far-right weaponry, suggesting that conventional weapon use has no effect on far-right incident 
success. 
 In the third model, I enter each opportunity variable in a final cumulative model in order 
to understand how specific attributes of far-right opportunity impact incident success. 
Interestingly, incidents involving near targets are significantly more likely to result in success, 
which supports hypothesis 1 (p ≤ .01). In addition, easy targets are significantly more likely to be 
successfully attacked relative to more hardened targets that involve protective security measures, 
lending some support for hypothesis 2 (p ≤ .05). Finally, I find support for hypothesis 4, as 
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incidents perpetrated by far-right loners are significantly more likely to be successfully carried 
out after controlling for other important opportunity variables (p ≤ .01). However, I find no 
significant association between the vitalness of targets, target iconicity, target legitimacy, target 
exposure and destructibility, far-right weaponry, and incident success.  
 
TABLE 3. Predicting Incident Outcomes Using Temporal and Opportunity Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Variables b(SE) OR b(SE) OR b(SE) OR b(SE) OR 
Temporal patterns        
  Conspiracy length .002(.002) 1.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  Preparatory length    --- --- .000(.002) 1.000 --- --- --- --- 
  Num. Antecedent    --- --- --- --- -0.08(.04)* .952 --- --- 
  Num. Preparatory     --- --- --- --- --- --- -.24(.10)* .787 
Significant opportunity controls        
   Near target -.003(.001)* .997 -.003(.001) * .997 -.002(.001)* .998 -.003(.001)* .997 
   Easy target 2.58(.92)** 13.195 1.96(.95)* 7.118 1.58(.72)* 4.877 1.62(.73)* 5.049 
   Loner 3.18(.96)** 24.079 3.24(1.98)*** 25.453 1.64(.84) ± 5.133 1.87(.78)* 6.504 
Constant -2.50(1.08) .082 -1.91(.96)* .148 -0.25(.83) .780 -.28(.78) .753 
Chi2 30.51 28.36 35.380 38.48 
Pseudo R2 .494 .533 .502 .536 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
60.98   48.13   68.26   65.16   
±p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.     
 
Next, I include a series of logistic regression models that test each independent measure 
of temporal patterns of precursor behavior against incident outcomes, net the effects of other 
statistically important opportunity variables. 15 As is shown in Table 3, the results for the first 
model indicate that conspiracy length is positively associated with successful incidents, though 
not statistically significant. It appears the length of time that takes place between the first known 
antecedent event and the incident date does not significantly impact far-right incident outcomes, 
providing no support for hypothesis 5. Notably, the opportunity variables remain statistically 
significant and in the expected direction, supporting research expectations.  
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In the second model, I examine how preparatory length impacts far-right incident 
outcomes controlling for the effects of opportunity. The results suggest that preparatory length is 
generally unassociated with incident success. That is, the length of time that takes place between 
the formation of the terrorist plot and the terrorism incident does not appear to significantly 
impact the likelihood of incident success, lending no support for hypothesis 5. Importantly, 
however, the remaining opportunity variables in model 2 maintain statistical significance. 
The third model introduces a temporal variable that attempts to measure the impact that 
the volume of precursor events has on incident success. As expected, I find that the number of 
antecedent acts occurring prior to an incident vary significantly across incident outcomes (p ≤ 
.05). Specifically, it appears that as the number of antecedent acts decrease, the greater the 
likelihood of a successful far-right incident. Moreover, with the introduction of this variable, far-
right group structure appears to lose statistical power, indicating a weak-to-modest association 
with incident success (p ≤ .052). This could be an artifact of the relatively small sample size in 
the current study, so caution should be used when interpreting results. However, the findings 
from model 3 suggest that easy and near targets remain significantly associated with successful 
far-right incidents.  
The fourth and final model examines the impact that the number of preparatory behaviors 
has on incident outcome. Providing further support for hypothesis 6, the results in Table 3 show 
that relative to unsuccessful incidents, successful far-right incidents are more likely to involve 
fewer preparatory acts, net the effects of other variables. The findings in model 4 also indicate 
that near and easy targets, as well as loners, remain significant predictors of successful far-right 
incidents, controlling for other statistically important variables. 
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In sum, the results from the multivariate statistical tests suggest that some measures of 
far-right terrorist opportunity and the temporal patterns of precursor conduct are important 
predictors of incident outcomes. Notably, near targets, easy targets, and far-right loners are 
shown to be consistently associated with far-right incident success across all models presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Moreover, both variables measuring the volume of precursor activity taking 
place prior to far-right incidents appear to have significant decreasing effects on far-right 
incident success. That is, fewer antecedent and preparatory acts are significantly associated with 
successful far-right incidents. In the following section, I provide a discussion of these major 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study set out to explore the impact that far-right terrorism opportunity structures and 
temporal patterns of precursor behavior have on incident outcomes. Given the relative paucity of 
research examining this issue, the current study contributes to the criminological literature in two 
broad ways. First, this paper integratively applied several theoretical strains to the study of 
ideologically motivated crime, providing a holistic approach for understanding terrorism 
outcomes. It was assumed that far-rightists carefully assess the costs and benefits associated with 
particular terrorism incidents, and that calculated decisions about target selection, weapon use, 
group structure, and precursor activities might ultimately affect the successfulness of terrorist 
attacks. Although the current study did not test any one theoretical model, the findings did 
suggest some support for tenets of situational crime prevention and other “opportunity” theories. 
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Additionally, this paper attempted to overcome several methodological limitations that have 
traditionally stunted efforts to advance empirically based explanations of terrorist offending. As 
noted by Gruenewald et al. (2009), the empirical rigor of previous far-right terrorism studies has 
been lacking. For instance, most far-right research has been absent original observations as well 
as quantitative analyses, including basic descriptive statistics. In order to overcome this issue, the 
current study utilized data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS) to empirically analyze 88 
far-right terrorism incidents occurring over the past 30 years. The bivariate and multivariate 
statistical analyses yielded several key findings that have implications for both future terrorism 
research and homeland security policy.  
First, this study found that incidents involving more attractive targets are more likely to 
result in success. Specifically, I found that near targets are negatively associated with successful 
far-right incidents, indicating that the closer far-rightists live to the target location, the more 
likely the terrorism incident will be carried out successfully. This finding is consistent with 
previous research regarding the geospatial patterns of domestic terrorist attacks, suggesting that 
the overwhelming majority of terrorism incidents occur relatively close to the terrorists’ 
residences (Cothren et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2006). Moreover, studies on criminals’ “journeys 
to crime” consistently show that offenders select easily accessible targets located in close 
proximity to where they live (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984; Phillips, 1980; Repetto, 1974; 
Wright & Decker, 1997). In the current case, it would seem that successful far-right terrorists 
rationally select familiar targets for which potential risks can be avoided when executing the 
terrorism incident. This finding also supports previous research maintaining that terrorist attack 
success often depends on whether terrorists’ knowledge of intended targets is well matched to 
the requirements of the planned operation (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009). 
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Next, findings from the current study partially support research expectations predicting 
that the more vulnerable a target is, the more likely the incident will be successfully executed. In 
particular, I found that easy targets were significantly more associated with successful incidents 
relative to more hardened targets that involve protective security measures. As a crime-reducing 
mechanism of the situational crime prevention approach, target hardening has been shown in the 
criminological literature to be a successful approach to preventing specific forms of crime (for a 
review of this literature, see Clarke, 1992). In the current study, it appears that target hardening 
can also be used to explain why some far-right terrorism incidents are averted, supporting Clarke 
and Newman’s (2007) argument that long term terrorism prevention practices necessitate plans 
to protect the most vulnerable of targets within communities.  
Third, findings showing that successful far-right incidents were significantly more likely 
to be carried out by lone actors were supportive of my research expectations. Since the advent of 
the “leaderless resistance” model of terrorism, far-rightists have increasingly utilized a “lone 
wolf” strategy to impede traditional law enforcement efforts intended to thwart potential attacks. 
Indeed, prior research on terrorists who utilize such tactics has shown that lone acting terrorists 
are significantly better educated, participate in significantly fewer precursor events per incident, 
live significantly farther away from the target location, and are better suited to avoid arrest than 
group-based terrorists (Smith et al., 2014, p.2). These patterns of lone actor terrorism in the 
United States highlight the clandestine nature of lone acting terrorism, suggesting that far-right 
lone actors are better equipped to avoid detection and infiltration by law enforcement, allowing 
them to successfully execute attacks. 
Finally, the results of this study also support expectations that incidents involving fewer 
antecedent and preparatory acts were significantly more likely to be successfully executed. One 
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explanation for this is that the selection of familiar targets located near the terrorists’ residences 
require them to engage in less precursor behaviors, such as surveillance of intended targets or 
meetings to discuss infiltrating a target’s security measures. Moreover, the current study also 
found that far-right incidents are more likely to be executed by lone actors, who by definition do 
not participate in some pre-incident planning and preparation activities that are typically 
associated with group-based terrorism (Smith et al., 2014). Additionally, findings from prior 
studies indicate that certain precursor acts are significantly more associated with unsuccessful 
terrorism incidents. For example, researchers from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and 
the American Terrorism Study (ATS) recently discovered that terrorists who engaged in some of 
the most common types of precursor behaviors, such as materials and weapons acquisitions, 
attempts to acquire expertise, and surveillance of targets were significantly less likely to 
complete the planned incident (Gruenewald, Parkin, Smith, Chermak, Freilich, Roberts, & Klein, 
2015).  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 Although the current paper is an important first step toward understanding terrorism 
incident success, this study was limited in a number of ways. First, the analysis only covered a 
relatively small number of far-right terrorism incidents, despite efforts to increase the sample 
size. Consequently, caution should be given when interpreting the results of multivariate 
analyses.16 Moreover, the current study specifically intended to examine characteristics 
associated with incident success for a single category of domestic terrorism. However, our 
understanding of the correlates of terrorism incident outcomes would be well served to also 
consider characteristics of incident success across other ideological movements. A future study 
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should comparatively analyze attributes of opportunity, planning and preparation length, and the 
volume of precursor activity associated terrorism incident success across other terrorist 
movements, including international terrorism and eco-terrorism.   
 Second, as the current study is the first attempt to operationalize the attractiveness and 
vulnerability of far-right terrorists’ target selection, future research should build upon this 
approach and explore different ways to measure target vulnerability and attractiveness. Again, 
our understanding of target selection would benefit greatly by extending the ideas set forth in this 
study to other forms of terrorism. Future research should comparatively study target vulnerability 
and attractiveness across domestic terrorist movements to gain a better understanding of how 
specific terrorist groups select targets to attack. 
 Finally, the current study was limited in the availability of temporal data to analyze.  
Verification of both the dates of the precursor events and the date of the terrorism incident was 
required for inclusion in this study. Future research should attempt to find ways to decrease the 
amount of missing temporal data, in addition to exploring new ways to measure terrorist 
longevity. For example, in the future researchers may wish examine the “life-span” or “life 
cycle” of individual terrorist-offenders. This research would hold a great deal of promise for 
counter-terrorism policy, as conceptualizing such a concept would involve measuring length of 
time that occurs between the first antecedent activity committed and the date of arrest. Moreover, 
future research should explore terrorism incident success on an individual level by measuring the 
impact that terrorist longevity, level of group involvement, and other personal characteristics 






 Since the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, terrorism prevention 
remains a top priority among homeland security officials, and a shared responsibility across all 
levels of law enforcement including federal, state, local, and tribal police. As part of a broad 
homeland security strategy, law enforcement agencies are increasingly focused on the prevention 
of terrorism through intelligence-led policing (ILP) strategies, which build upon the basic tenets 
of community policing, problem solving, and partnerships (Carter & Carter, 2009; McGarrell, 
Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). Additionally, greater emphasis has been placed on the role of local 
law enforcement in the prevention of terrorist attacks through the identification and protection of 
vulnerable and attractive targets (Clarke & Newman, 2007). This section integrates findings from 
the current study into a broader discussion of the policy implications, and also suggests possible 
best practices for terrorism prevention.  
As demonstrated in this study, terrorists who select targets closer to home are 
significantly more likely to successfully execute attacks. Research on the geospatial patterns of 
domestic terrorism maintains that terrorists tend to plan, prepare, and carry out attacks relatively 
close to home (Smith et al., 2006). In this way, far-right terrorism appears to be a local event 
committed by violent extremists who may already be known to local law enforcement officials. 
Since local police agencies are most likely to collect vital information about the groups or 
individuals at risk for engaging in terrorist crimes, ILP tactics based on the systematic analysis of 
raw information, and the use of problem-solving strategies, may aid in the identification of 
imminent threats prior to the commission of a terrorism incident (McGarrell et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the results from the current analysis also suggest that successful far-right incidents 
involve significantly fewer antecedent and preparatory behaviors. At first glance, this finding 
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presents a problem for local law enforcement, as it appears that successful far-rightists commit 
attacks without engaging in a high volume of precursor events, and thus, provide law 
enforcement with relatively fewer opportunities for infiltration and interdiction. Nonetheless, 
terrorism remains a local problem and law enforcement must remain vigilant. Focusing 
preventative patrols on potentially high-risk target areas (Smith, 2008), while also gathering 
intelligence on known violent extremists and their suspicious activities through community 
partnerships and routine police work would be a promising strategy for thwarting future plots.  
Another key finding of this study is that far-right terrorism incidents perpetrated by lone 
actors are significantly more likely to be successfully executed. While some scholars assert that 
loner attacks cannot be prevented (Barnes, 2012), the underlying principles and tactics of ILP as 
a broad framework for combatting terrorism suggests otherwise. For example, one of the 
distinguishing features of ILP involves the gathering of intelligence on key threats (Carter & 
Carter, 2009), including threats posed by violent extremists, organizations, and the interactions 
between violent extremists. One way in which the literature has shown that loners interact is 
through the public sharing of information through Internet postings and participating in chat 
rooms (Artiga, 2010; Kaati & Svenson, 2011; Michael, 2012; Gruenewald et al. 2013b). 
Terrorism prevention practices, therefore, would be well suited to monitor far-right loners’ 
reliance on the Internet in order to gather actionable intelligence. Furthermore, local law 
enforcement agencies could create websites and chat rooms that attract the attention of far-right 
extremists in order to more closely monitor their activities. Finally, engaging in 
counterpropaganda tactics over the Internet that avert the frustrations and beliefs that lead to far-
right extremist violence may provide law enforcement with a promising avenue to prevent future 
acts of lone wolf terrorism (Dugan & Chenowith, 2012; Gruenewald et al., 2013b).   
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Lastly, findings from the current study suggest that targets that are more vulnerable and 
easy to penetrate are significantly more likely to be successfully attacked. According to Clarke 
and Newman (2007), a key role for local law enforcement in the prevention of terrorism is 
identifying and protecting targets that are attractive to terrorists and vulnerable to attack. One 
way to reduce the vulnerability of far-right targets is to utilize directed police patrols in high-risk 
target areas, or “hot spots” for far-right terrorism, which has been demonstrated in the 
criminological literature to be an effective approach to reducing specific forms of crime (Cohen 
& Ludwig, 2003; McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, & Wilson, 2001; Sherman & Rogan, 1995). Other 
strategies for reducing vulnerability to far-right targets would include hiring private security 
guards, installing screening procedures, and constructing fences and other physical barriers to 
prevent the target from being easily accessed. Although such tactics are an expensive option for 




Far-right terrorists in the United States have been shown to be a persistent and serious 
threat to public safety over the past 30 years. While scholarship on fatal far-right attacks is 
growing, to date no study has examined attributes of far-right terrorism incident success. The 
current paper sets out fill specific gaps in the extant research by exploring the impact that far-
right opportunity structures and temporal patterns of precursor conduct have on incident 
outcomes. Several notable findings emerged from the analysis, indicating that far-right incident 
success was significantly associated with low levels of target vulnerability and attractiveness, 
group structures of far-right actors, and a low volume of antecedent and preparatory conduct. 
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While the findings of this study are important for our overall understanding of why some 
terrorism incidents succeed while others fail, they are not conclusive. Rather, the findings in the 
current study suggest that more research on this topic is needed for both theoretical development 























                                                 
1 Antecedent conduct is defined as “the totality of non-terrorist crimes committed by a terrorist 
group. Antecedent offenses may be of two types: preparatory crimes – crimes committed to 
assist in the preparation of a terrorist incident; and ancillary crimes – crimes committed for order 
maintenance, internal security or personal reasons” (Smith et al., 2008, p. 10). 
 
2 While I concur that tools and facilitating conditions are important to terrorist opportunity 
structures, the proposed study focuses exclusively on how target selection and weapon use 
structure terrorist’ opportunities for successfully completing terrorist attacks. 
 
3 According to Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006, p.2), preparatory behaviors are defined 
as both criminal and non-criminal conduct by far-right terrorists in preparation for a terrorism 
incident. 
 
4 Subject matter experts included Steven Chermak (militias); Mark Hamm (white supremacy 
groups); Austin Turk (political violence); Ron Arnold (environmental extremism); and Bill 
Dyson (leftist terrorism). For a full review of this methodology, see Smith et al (2006, 2008).  
5 These researchers were primarily graduate research assistants and undergraduate interns 
affiliated with the University of Arkansas’ Terrorism Research Center housed in Fulbright 
College. However, researchers from the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies 
(MCIIS) in Erie, Pennsylvania were also utilized for a select number of cases.  
 
6 For further information, see Better Management Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to 
Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-Related Statistics, General Accounting Office report, January 
2003. 
 
7 Given the volume of unsuccessful terrorism incidents included in the sample, the current study 
did not measure the Occupied status of targets, which is operationalized as whether the target 
was occupied during the time of attack (Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, & Klein, 2015). 
 
8 Incidents were excluded from analysis when the resident locations for all the perpetrators 
involved in the attack could not be identified and for targets in which the address information 
could not be identified. For incidents in which only information on the city was known, a 
straight-line distance calculation was computed between the city of the closest perpetrator’s 
residence and the city in which the target was located. 
 
9 It is important to note that strictly human targets were coded in relation to the physical location 
at which the incident occurred. For example, since members of the Order murdered Jewish radio 
host Alan Berg at his home, the target’s exposure was placed in the context of Berg’s private 
dwelling, and coded as accessible, but rarely frequented by the public (non-exposed). 
Additionally, for planned incidents involving human targets where the location of the intended 
attack was unknown, the environment in which the target was housed on a daily basis was 
considered. For instance, target exposure for planned attacks against specific abortion clinic 
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employees were coded as exposed, since targets of this nature are routinely housed in the 
medical clinic for which they are employed and frequented by the public. 
 
10 For a majority of cases, coders used Google Maps/Images to evaluate the size and physical 
structure of targets in order to accurately assess target destructibility. For structures or buildings 
that could not be located on Google Maps/Images, the target structure-type was considered and 
the least amount of weaponry required for destruction was coded. 
 
11 In some cases there was incomplete temporal data for significant precursor events and 
terrorism incidents. Coders, therefore, attempted to add missing values by estimating dates. If 
only the event or incident month was known, the 15th day of the month was coded. If only the 
event or incident year was known, coders used the mid-point for that given year. If information 
like the season or time of year was available, coders used the mid-point of that season. For 
planned incidents in which not date was given, arrest dates were used. This coding scheme was 
also used to add missing values for calculating the planning length variable.  
 
12 It should be noted that accurately identifying evidence of explicit intent to engage in terrorist 
activity presented significant challenges in some cases. For example, in one precursor event 
linked to a far-right incident targeting federal law enforcement agencies, a group of far-right 
militia members conducted weapons training using a poster of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) agent. During the training session, one of the co-conspirators 
turned to the group, held up the target, and stated, “this is our objective.” Consequently, coders 
identified this as the first evidence of a plot formation, as the actions of the militia group implied 
the formation of a terrorist plot. 
 
13 Since the dependent variable is nearly evenly distributed, I also conducted a series of OLS 
regression analyses to assess the robustness of the primary findings. The results from the OLS 
regression generally mirror key findings from the logistic regression models. 
 
14 It is important to note that because some of the predictor variables are closely related (i.e. 
variables measuring the attractiveness and vulnerability of targets), I conducted a series of tests 
to check for multicollinearity among the independent variables. First, I examined the 
correlations. The results showed that all correlation coefficients were less than .5, indicating no 
potential multicollinearity issues. Next, I conducted collinearity diagnostics to measure the 
extent to which the regressors are related to each other. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
revealed a score of less than 5 for each predictor variable, suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
an issue in the current study. 
 
15 Consideration is given to the potential for over estimating odds ratios, which could lead to 
biased estimates. As logistic regression models require a minimum of 10 valid cases (in the 
current study, incidents) per independent variable (Agresti, 2007), I conduct a series of binary 
logistic regression models in which a 10 to 1 ratio is maintained. 
 
16 Although not shown in the current study, I analyzed a series of fully saturated logistic 
regression models regressing incident outcomes on each measure of the far-right opportunity 
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structure, in addition to independent measures of temporal patterns of precursor conduct. The 
results indicated only marginal differences from the findings presented in the current study. 
However, it should be noted that in order to conduct these analyses the 10 to 1 ratio required for 
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